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StickyPrices As Coordination Failure
ABSTRACT
This paper shows that nominal price rigidity can arise from a failure to
coordinate price changes. If a firm's desired price is increasing in others'
prices, then the gains to the firm from adjusting its price after a nominal
shock are greater if others adjust. This "strategic coniplementarity" in price
adjustment can lead to multiple equilibria in the degree of nominal rigidity.
Welfare may be much higher in the equilibria with less rigidity. In addition,
with multiple equilibrium degrees of rigidity, the economy may have several
short-run equilibria but a unique long—run equilibrium.
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Many recent attempts to provide microfoundations for Keynesian mac-
roeconomics are based on the idea that agents In a decentralized economy are
unable to coordinate their actions. Coordination problems can arise in trade
(e.g., Diamond, 1982), production (e.g., Bryant, 1983), and demand (e.g.,
Kiyotaki, 1985).1 As Cooper and John (1986) point out, the essential feature
of coordination failure models is "strategic complementarlty": a positive
dependence of an agent's optimal "effort" (for example, level of production or
time spent searching for trading partners) on the effort of others. Economies
with strategic coinpiementarities may possess multiple equilibria in the level
of effort, with high effort equilibria Pareto superior to low effort equi—
libria.This formalizes the idea that an economy may be stuck in an
"underemployment" equilibrium even though a superior equilibrium exists.
While recent coordination failure models capture Important Keynesian
ideas, they appear irrelevant to one central feature of Keynesian economics:
rigidities in nominal wages and prices. Current coordination failure models
contain only real variables. Indeed, many authors present such models as an
alternative to older Keynesian theories that explain underemployment with
nominal rigidities.
See also Hart (1982), Weitzman (1982), Heller (1985), Shleifer (1986), and
the references in Cooper and John.2
This paper shows that nominal rigidities can arise front a failure to
coordinate price changes. This failure has the essential features of coor-
dination failures involving real variables such as the level of production or
trade.Flexibility of one firm's price increases the incentives for other
firms to make their prices flexible. This strategic complementarity implies
that there may be multiple equilibria in the degree of nominal rigidity.
Equilibria with less rigidity (more "effort" devoted to price adjustment) are
often Pareto superior to equilibria with more rigidity.
We demonstrate these results in a "menu cost" model similar to the ones
in Mankiw (1985), Blanchard and Kiyotakl (1985), and Ball and Romer (1987a).
Section II describes the model and Section III presents our main results. In
the model, imperfectly competitive firms choose whether to pay a small cost of
adjusting prices after a nominal shock. Previous work shows that, because of
externalities from price rigidity, considerable rigidity can be an equilibrium
even If the result is large, highly inefficient fluctuations in output. This
paper shows that the model has additional equilibria with less rigidity.
Specifically, for a range of realizations of the shock, both full adjustment
of prices and complete non-adjustment are equilibria; this implies that an
economy facing a distribution of shocks possesses a continuum of equilibrium
degrees of rigidity. Thus the economic fluctuations that result from nominal
disturbances would be greatly reduced, and welfare might greatly improve, if
firms could "agree" to make their prices more flexible. The size of the con-
tinuum of equilibria is increasing in the degree of strategic complementarity3
inprice adjustment.2
Section IV sketches two extensions of our analysis. First, we introduce
heterogeneity among price setters, which leads to equilibria in which some
prices adjust to a shock and others do not.In this version of the model,
there may be multiple equilibria in the proportion of prices that adjust, and
hence In the size of a shock's real effects.Second, we consider a simple
dynamic version of our model in which firms choose between adjusting prices
every period and adjusting every two periods.There can be multiple equi-
libria in the frequency of price changes, and therefore in the speed with
which the price level adjusts to shocks. In addition, this example illustrates
a difference between our model and other coordination failure models: while
the economy may possess multiple short-run equilibria, it converges to a
unique long-run equilibrium (output equal to the natural rate).
Section V discusses the policy implications of our results and offers
conclusions.
II. THE MODEL
The model Is the same as in Ball and Romer (1987a), where we provide more
details. The economy consists of N producer-consumers, or "yeoman farmers."
2The surveys of menu cost models by Blanchard (1987) and Rotemberg (1987)
contain other discussions of multiple equilibria in the degree of rigidity;
Rotemberg's argument is closer to ours. (Rotemberg's paperandthis one were
written independently and should be viewed as complementary.) Cooper (1987)
presents a model of labor and commodity contracts in which both predetermined
nominal prices and full indexation to nominal shocks are equilibria.4
N is large.Each farmer uses his ownlaborto produce a differentiated
product, then sells the product and purchases the products of all other
farmers. Farmers take each others prices as given.







Li is farmer i's labor supply;
C is an index of farmer l's consumption;
Cjj is farmer l's consumption of the product of farmer j;
z is a small positive constant (the menu cost);
D1 is a dummy variable equal to one if' farmer I changes his nominal
price;
c is the elasticity of substitution between any two goods (c>1);
y measures the extent of increasing marginal disutility of labor (y>1).
Farmer i has a linear production function:
(3) Yj Li
where is farmer i's output. A transactions technology determines the rela-
tion between aggregate consumption and real money balances:
(4) C =5
where
(5) C —E C4;
Nj:i
''
(6) P = E1—j1/(1—c)
Nj 1
C is average consumption, P1 is the price of farmer l's product, and P is the
price index corresponding to (2).
Equations (1)-(6) determine the demand for farmer l's product:
(7) =
Farmeri's consumption equals his real revenues:
PiYi
(8)C
Substituting (7) and (8) into (1) yields farmer i's utility as a function of
real balances and the farmer's relative price:
(9) U1 =(M)()(1•e)—C—1(M)Y(1)Ic —zD1
Differentiation of (9) shows that farmer l's utility—maximizing price
neglecting menu costs is
(10) P4M1, = 1- ,0<<1
yc-c+1
* 4s Isthe elasticity of P1 with respect to the aggregate price level.(10)
Implies that, in the absence of menu costs, symmetric equilibrium occurs when
Pi:PM.
CombinIng (9)and(10) yields farmer i's utility as a function of real
balances, the ratio of his price to the utility-maximizing level, and the menu
cost:6





In what follows, we use (11) as our expression for utility.3
III. COORDINATION FAILURE IN PRICE ADJUSTMENT
In this section, we assume that the economy starts with M1 and
for all 1.A shock occurs: H changes to 1-i-x.Each farmer then decides
whether to pay the menu cost and change his price to the new P. Part A of
the section shows that, for a range of x, both adjustment by all farmers and
non-adjustment by all are equilibria. This implies that the economy possesses
a continuum of equilibrium degrees of nominal rigidity. Part B discusses the
importance of strategic complementarity In price setting for this result.
Part C compares welfare in the different equilibria.
The simplifying assumption that initially all prices equal one is ad hoc.
Therefore, in an Appendix we follow Ball and Romer (1987a) in assuming that
farmers choose initial prices optimally given a distribution of shocks with
3Our use of specific functional forms simplifies the analysis but is not im-
portant for the result below that there are multiple equilibria.Writing
farmer l's utility as a function of real money and his relative price,
W(M/P,P1/P) (see (9)), all that is needed Is -W>W1>O at a point where
W2(M/P,1)O (subscripts denote partial derivatives). WO at P1/P=1 is neces-
sary for symmetric equilibrium; W22<O is the second order condition for farmer
1; W12>O is necessary for the equilibrium to be stable; and -W22>W12 is re-
quired for strategic complenientarity.7
mean zero. Even though the mean of the ex post money supply is one, farmers
set initial prices different from one --thatis, certainty equivalence fails
--becauseutility is not quadratic. We show, however, that the results in
the text are altered only slightly.
A. Multiple Equilibria
We first solve for the range of shocks over which non-adjustment of all
prices is an equilibrium. This is similar to computations in previous menu
cost papers.Then we determine the range over which full adjustment is an
equilibrium. The two ranges overlap, possibly substantia1ly.
Non-adjustment is an equilibrium when farmer I chooses not to pay the
menu cost if no other farmer pays. If farmer I maintains a rigid price along
with the others, then D1O. P=?1, which implies MI?M and, using (10),
1/Ml. Thus the farmer's utility is V(M,
1
If farmer I pays the menu cost despite others' non-adjustment, then Dj1.
Adjustment of one price does not affect the aggregate price level, so P1 and
M/?M. Adjustment allows farmer i to set ?E', so P/P71. Thus farmer
l's utility Is V(M,1) —z.
These results imply that farmer i chooses not to pay the menu cost -—and
so rigidity is an equilibrium --if
(12) GM <Z
4Onecan showthat if both full adjustment of prices and complete non-
adjustment are equilibria, then there is a third equilibrium in which some
prices adjust and others do not. This equilibrium is unstable.8
GN V(M,1) —V(M, ) -
GNis the gain to a farmer from adjusting given that others do not adjust.
(12) states that rigidity is an equilibrium If is less than the menu cost.
Taking a second order approximation of GN around M:1 yields
(13) _(1_4)2v2
where xM—1 and subscripts of V denote partial derivatives evaluated at (1,1)
(V22(1,1)<O). The derIvatIon of (13) uses the fact that V2(1,1):V12(1,1):O.
(13) shows that the gain from adjusting is increasing in the size of the
shock.(12) and (13) imply that the gain is less than the menu cost, and so




Price flexibility Is an equilibrium when farmer i chooses to paythemenu
cost if all others pay.If farmer i pays along with the others, then D11.
P1=PM (the equilibrium under flexible prices), which implies M/P 1 and
1. Thus utility is V(1,1) —z.
If farmer i does not pay the menu cost even though others do, then DiO.
PM but Pj:1, which Implies MI? 1and, using (10), Pj/P1/M. Farmer l's
utility Is V(1, 1)
These results show that farmer I pays the menu cost If
(15) GA > Z
GA E V(1,1) —V(1,)
FlexibilityIs an equilibrium If GA, the gain from adjusting given that others9




Like G, GA is increasing in the size of the shock. (15) and (16) imply that
flexibility is an equilibrium if ixi>xA, where
(17)xA :/T




4>,theelasticity of P with respect to F, is between zero and one. Thus
xA<xN. If lxiisbetween xA and xN, then both rigidity and flexibility are
equilibria.5
These results can be summarized as follows. For small monetary shocks -—
I x<x—-eachfarmer refuses to pay the menu cost regardless of others'
decisions, and so rigidity is the only equilibrium.For large shocks ——
ixi>xN——eachfarmer pays regardless of others, and so flexibility is the
only equilibrium.But for shocks of intermediate size --xA<ixi<xN--a
farmer pays if and only if others do. To see why, consider a positive shock
for concreteness and recall that a farmer's utility maximizing price, P, is
P4>M14>. If others keep their prices fixed at one, then rises to M4>. By
5As noted above, previous analyses of menu cost models (for example,
Blanchard and Kiyotaki) derive the conditions under which nominal rigidity is
an equilibrium. Thus they focus on what we call and ignore the existence
of multiple equilibria. An exception is Rotemberg (discussed in n. 2), who
focuses on xA and notes that there are multiple equilibria.10
itself, this does not induce the farmer to paythemenu cost. But if others
adjust their prices, then P rises to M and 7 rises to M>M14. That is, if
others adjust, they change their prices in the same direction as the money
supply, which pushes P7 farther from one. Since the desired increase in pjis
larger, the incentive to adjust is larger, and so the farmer pays the menu
cost.Since the farmer pays if and only if others do, there are two
equilibria.6
These results concern equilibrium responses to a single shock. Now sup-
pose that farmers face a distribution of shocks and choose rules for when to
pay the menu cost, and consider the equilibrium rules. We restrict attention
to equilibria in which all farmers pay the menu cost if lxi is greater than a
cutoff, x —-thatis, if the money supply lies outside of (1_x*,1+x*). is
a natural measure of the degree of rigidity. Our results imply that any value
of x between xA and xN is an equilibrium --afarmer will adopt any value in
this range as a cutoff if all others do. Thus there is a continuum of equi-
libriuni degrees of nominal rigidity.7
6Accoiuodating monetary policy would be another source of multiple equl-
libria. Suppose the money supply rule Is changed from M1+x to M1+c(P-1)+x,
O<c<1. Since P1 if prices are rigid, xN is not affected. But if prices are
flexible, the equilibrium level of P and H is 1+[x/(1-c)] rather than 1+x. As
a result, xA ='([-2z(1-c))/V22and xN/xA 1/E(1-4)(1-c)1. Thus accoinodat—
ing monetary policy increases the range of multiple equilibria and makesmul-
tiple equilibria possible even if 4O.Intuitively, accomodating policy
creates an additional source of strategic coinpienientarity: when others raise
their prices, H rises, which raises
7The economy also possesses equilibria with less natural rules for when to
change prices. For example, the set of realizations of H for which prices are
rigid can be an asymmetric range, (1-4,1+4), or even a disconnected set,11
B. The Role of Strategic Complementarity
As the preceding discussion makes clear, multiple equilibria are possible
because a farmer's incentive to adjust his price is greater if others adjust.
In Cooper and John's terminology, there is "strategic complementarity" in
price adjustment. Equations (12) and (15) show that this is tied to a simpler
kind of strategic complenientarity: the positive dependence of a farmer's
utility-maximizing price neglecting menu costs on the prices of others. The
* degreeto which G exceeds GN depends on ,theelastIcIty of' P1 wIth respect
to P.8
Equation (18) shows that the size of the range of shocks for which there
are two equilibria depends on the degree of strategic complementarity.If
there is little strategic complenientarity --thatis, if is close to zero
--thena farmer's desired price, and hence his incentive to pay the menu
cost, changes little when others adjust their prices. Thus xN is close to xA.
In contrast, with strong strategic coinpiementarity the range of multiple equi-
libria can be very large.This is illustrated by the special case of' y-'l
* (constantmarginal utility of leisure).When y÷1, 41 and Pj:P --each
farmer desires a price equal to the aggregate price level. If others do not
change their prices, then farmer 1 has no desire to change his regardless of
8WhIle the result that a farmer'sutility—maximizing price increases with
others' prices is clearly realistic, one can find cases In which It does not
hold.4 can be negative --pricescan be strategic substitutes --iffarmers
are risk averse in consumption (see Ball and Romer, 1987a) or if aggregate
demand increases more than one-for-one with real money (as in Ball, 1987). If
4 is negative, there is always a unique equilibrium In the fraction of
farmers who adjust their prices.12
the size of the shock: GO and xN* (see (13) and (1t)). But if others ad-
just, the benefits of adjusting with them are positive, and so the farmer ad-
justs if the shock Is sufficiently large.From (16) and (17), GA
(1/2)(c—1)x2 and V2z/(c—1i. Thus there are two equilibria for any >
V2z/(c—1)•9
Finally,note that the degree of strategic complementarity necessary for
multiple equilibria Is much weaker here than in most models of coordination
faIluresIn previous work, an agent's choice of "effort" is a continuous
variable. In this case, a necessary condition for multiple equilibria is that
over some range an agent's effort increase more than one-for-one with others'
effort: a reaction function must somewhere have slope greater than one to
cross the 15 degree line more than once. In our model, the choice of whether
to pay the menu cost is discrete. As a result, there are multiple equilibria
as long as a farmer's desired price is simply increasing in others' prices.
For some values of the shock, this weak strategic complementarity is enough
for adjustment by others to push the gain from adjusting above the menu
also approaches one as c- --thatIs, as the product market approaches
perfect competition.In this case, however, GN+0' and XN+O (xN/xA still ap-
proaches infinity because A approaches zero more quickly than xN).When
markets are competitive, a farmer's desired price change is small If others'
prices are rigid, but the cost of forgoing even a small change Is large. For-
mally, GN- because V22 grows more quickly than (1_4)2 shrinks (see (13)).13
cost. 10
C. Welfare
Many coordination failure models possess multiple equilibria that can be
Pareto ranked.In particular, high "effort" equilibria (for example, those
with high levels of production) are often superior to low effort equilibria.
It is natural to ask whether this is the case in the current model.When
there are multiple equilibria in the degree of price rigidity, is less
rigidity (more effort expended on price adjustment) better?
To study welfare, we assume as above that farmers face a distribution for
the monetary shock, x, and pay the menu cost if lxi exceeds a cutoff, x.
For a symmetric distribution with mean zero, we derive the socially optimal
value of x --theone that maximizes farmers' expected utility. To determine
the welfare properties of equilibrium rigidity, we compare the optimal x* to
xA and xN, the endpoints of the range of equilibria. We continue to assume
that farmers initially set their prices to one, the equilibrium value in the
absence of shocks; the Appendix studies the case in which initial prices are
0The importance of whether choice variables are continuous or discrete
carries over to other settings.For example, multiple equilibria in the
length of labor contracts requires that a firm's optimal contract length be
increasing at least one—for-one in the length of other contracts (see the re-
lated discussion in Section IVB). In contrast, multiple equilibria in the
fraction of firms that renegotiate contracts after a shock requires only that
the gains from renegotiating be increasing in the fraction that renegotiate.11$
chosen optimally given the distribution of shocks.11
Recall that a farmer's utility is V(1,1) -zif all farmers pay the menu







whereF(') is the cumulative distribution function for M and f(•) is the den-








where we use the fact that f(1+x)=f(1-x) by our assumption that f() is sym-





Ourcentral welfare result follows from substituting the appropriate
derivatives of V(•) into (21) and the expressions for xN and xA:
(22) xA <X3 < XN.
We study average welfare given a distribution of shocks because the wel-
fare effect of rigidity after an individual shock depends on the sign of the
shock (Manklw, 1985; Ball and Roiner, 1987a). Non-adjustment to a fall in the
money supply reduces output and welfare. But non-adjustment to a positive
shock increases output. This raises welfare because, under imperfect competi-
tion, the no-shock level of output is too low.15
Since xS<xN, there is a range of equilibrium values of x (xS<x*<xN) with too
much rigidity -—inthese equilibria, all farmers would be better off if the
cutoff were lowered.Since xS>xA, there is a range of equilibria with too
much flexibility.Finally, the social optimum (x*=x5) is always an equi-
librium.
The reason that too much rigidity is possible is similar to the one in
Ball and Ronier (1987a). Suppose that all farmers start with an arbitrary x.
If one farmer lowers hIs cutoff whIle the others do not, the farmer's only
* * benefitis that he sets more frequently.But if' others reduce x as
well, there is an additional benefit: stabilization of real aggregate demand.
Because the incentive for an Individual to reduce x is smaller than the gain
* ifall do, values of x above x5 can be equilibria.
Values of x below xS can be equilibria --therecan be too much
flexibility --becausea farmer's gain from raising x Is also smaller If he
does so by himself than if all do. If the others do not join the farmer In
raising x, then for some shocks he does not adjust his price but others do.
Others' adjustment Increases movements in p7, which raises the farmer's loss
from non—adjustment. (Others' adjustment still benefits the farmer by
stabilizing real aggregate demand, but this effect Is smaller.)
While both excessive rigidity and excessive flexibility are possible, the
magnitudes of the potential losses are very different. Neglecting the menu
cost, full flexibility is always optimal; thus the net loss from too much
flexibility is bounded by the menu cost. In actual economies, menu costs ap-
pear small. In contrast, Ball and Romer (1987a) show that the loss from too16
much rigidity can be arbitrarily large, because the externality from increased
fluctuations in real aggregate demand can be large compared to the private
cost of rigidity.Thus excessive price flexibility is not likely to be a
serious economic problem, while excessive rigidity may be.
IV. EXTENSIONS
A. Heterogeneous Agents
In the model of Section II, multiple equilibria arise when each farmer
chooses to adjust his price if and only if others do. The desire to make the
same decision as others is crucial. A natural question is whether multiple
equilibria are possible if heterogeneity leads some agents to adjust while
others do not. This section shows that models with heterogeneity can possess
multiple equilibria in the proportion of prices that adjust, and therefore in
the size of the real effects of a nominal shock. We focus on heterogeneity in
the size of menu costs, which is the simplest case. Strategic coinplementarity
is necessary for multiple equilibria; the sufficient condition depends on the
distribution of the menu cost.We also briefly discuss the case of
heterogeneous productivity shocks.
Assume that the menu cost, z, varies across farmers with a cumulative
distribution function H(z). After a shock, farmers with z below some critical
level adjust their prices and the others do not. Let k be the proportion that
adjust. We derive an equilibrium condition for k.
Let PA(X,k) be the price set by those who adjust and let P(x,k) be the
aggregate price level.Note that =P4(1+x)4'and (approximating17




By reasoning similar to that of Section III, the gain from adjusting is
1-s-x 1+x 1
(214) G(x,k) V( ,1)— , )
P(x,k) P(x,k) P(x,k)4(1+x)4)
Using (23) and (214), one can show that





The gain from adjusting is increasing in the proportion of firms that adjust.
This is a generalization of the earlier result that the gains are greater when
all adjust than when none adjusts.Again, adjustment by others moves the
price level in the same direction as the money supply, which increases the
deviation of P from one.
A farmer pays his menu cost if it is less than G(x,k). Thus the propor-
tion that payisH(G(x,k)), and an equilibrium k is one that satisfies
3H(G(x ,k))
kH(G(x,k)). A necessary condition for multiple equilibria is >0
3H(G(x,k))dH 3G
3k
over some range. Since =—•—— andH(') is increasing over some
3k dG3k
range, the condition reduces to (26), which holds because of strategic corn—
plementarity. The sufficient condition depends on the size of x and the shape
of H(•); it is easy to find examples both of multiple equilibria and of
unique equilibria.
Heterogeneity in real shocks leads to similar results. Suppose that the18
production function, (3), is replaced by
(27)
Assume that 0 varies across farmers, and that a shock to 01 occurs at the
same time as the monetary shock.In this version of the model, a farmer
chooses to pay the menu cost if is above an upper cutoff or below a lower
cutoff; both critical values depend on x and k. Again, one can show that mul-
tiple equilibria are possible and that strategic complementarity is a neces-
sary condition.
B. Long-Run and Short-Run Effects of Nominal Shocks
This section describes a difference between our model and previous work
on coordination failures.In earlier models, which include only real vari-
ables, there is never any reason for an economy in an "underemployment" equi-
librium to leave it. For example, If each agent in the Diamond model does not
search because others do not search, this situation does not improve over
time.In contrast, our model of nominal rigidities suggests differences be-
tween short-run and long—run equilibria.It Is plausible to suppose that
eventually menus wear out or enough shocks accumulate to cause all firms to
adjust their prices. If this Is the case, then our model implies that there
is a unique long-run response to a shock --pricesadjust fully and output
converges to the natural rate --butthat there may be multiple equilibrium19
transition paths.12
To formalize this idea, we add simple dynamics to our model. Assume that
the money supply follows a random walk. A farmer sets his price for a fixed
length of time and chooses the length to maximize utility. Specifically, he
chooses between setting his price every period after observing the current
money supply and setting it for two periods at every even period. The farmer
pays a fixed menu cost for every adjustnient.3
This version of the model can possess multiple equilibria in the
frequency of price changes. The proof is a straightforward extension of the
one for the static model. Intuitively, more frequent price adjustment implies
that the aggregate price level responds more quickly to shocks. By making the
price level more volatile, frequent adjustment by others increases the fluc-
tuations in a farmer's desired nominal price, and thus raises his incentive to
adjust frequently. For some parameter values, a farmer's incentive to change
his price every period exceeds the added menu costs if and only if others ad-
just every period.
120f course it is not clear whether a unique long-run equilibrium for output
is a desirable feature of our model.While many modern Keynesians believe
that output converges to a natural rate, many older Keynesians emphasize
permanent underemployment equilibria. In addition, Campbell and Mankiw (1986)
and Blanchard and Summers (1986) provide empirical evidence that shocks to
output and employment have permanent effects.
3This is a version of the "contract length" model introduced by Gray
(1978).Note that we assume synchronized timing of price changes —-if
farmers set prices for two periods, they all set them in the same (even)
periods. Since the model contains only aggregate shocks, this is the equi-
librium timing (see Fethke and Policano, 198k, and Ball and Romer, 1987b).
Our results would not change if we assumed asynchronized timing.20
Since all prices adjust eventually, money is neutral in the long run.
But there may be two possible short-run responses to a monetary shock: full
price adjustment and neutrality, or price rigidity and real effects that last
for a period.
We believe that similar results arise in more general models, such as
continuous time models in which firms can choose any frequency of price
changes.These models are likely to possess richer sets of equilibria (for
example, several equilibrium speeds at which output returns to the natural
rate following a shock). We suspect that, as in models with heterogeneity,
sufficient conditions for multiple equilibria depend on assumptions about
functional forlns.h't
V. CONCLUSION
This paper shows that nominal price rigidity can arise from a failure of
firms to coordinate price changes.Increases in price flexibility by dif-
ferent firms are strategic complements --greaterflexibility of one firm's
price raises the incentives for other firms to make their prices more
flexible. Strategic coniplementarity leads to multiple equilibria in the de-
gree of nominal rigidity, and welfare may be much higher in the low rigidity
equilibria. Thus the inefficient economic fluctuations resulting from nominal
this case, the specification of the cost of changing prices is likely
to be important. In Ball's (1987) model of labor contracts, the cost of writ-
ing a contract is fixed and the equilibrium contract length Is unique. One
can show, however, that if shorter contracts are less expensive than longer
contracts, the model may possess multiple equilibria.21
shocks might be greatly reduced if agents could "agree" to move to a superior
equilibrium.
The essential element of our model --strategiccomplementarity leading
to multiple equilibria --isalso central to models of coordination failure in
trade, production, and demand.But in contrast to previous work, our model
possesses a unique long-run equilibrium despite the multiplicity of short—run
equilibria.
Multiple equilibria that are Pareto ranked imply a role for government
policy: moving the economy to a superior equilibrium.In actual economies,
for example, incentives for firms to sign shorter labor contracts or to adopt
greater Indexation might lead to an equilibrium with less nominal wage
rigidity. Government intervention could be temporary --aftera policy led
firms to increase flexibility, each firm would have sufficient private incen-
tives to maintain flexibility.
As Cooper and John point out, strategic complementarity implies that
policy hasamultiplier.15 For example, if intervention led some firms to
shorten their labor contracts, this would increase the incentives for other
wage and price setters to reduce rigidity. Thus a policy aimed at part of the
labor market could reduce rigidity throughout the economy.
5There is a multiplier even if the equilibrium degree of rigidity is unique
(for example, in a dynamic model). The size of the multiplier is increasing
in the degree of strategic complementarity.22
APPENDIX
This Appendix relaxes the assumption that all prices equal one before the
monetary shock occurs. We assume instead that farmers choose initial prices
optimally and show how this affects our results. The analysis draws heavily
on Ball and Romer (1987a). As in that paper, we assume that the distribution
of the monetary shock Is symmetric around zero, single-peaked, and continuous.
Theprice that a farmer sets before observing the money supply depends on
others' initial prices and on the valueof the cutoff x. In symmetric equi-
librium,each farmer's initial price is
* Y"2* (Al) P0(x ) 1+—o(x)
where(x*) is the variance of M conditional on l_x*<M<l+x* (see our earlier
paper). Given our use of second order approximations, assuming initial prices
equal to P0 rather than one does not affect our results about equilibrium
rigidity: the expressions for xN and xA in the text remain valid (our earlier
paper shows this for xN). We now show, however, that the socially optimal de-
gree of rigidity changes slightly.
If initial prices are P0 and prices are rigid, then MIPH/P0 and
=P01/MThus when initial prices are set optimally, a farmer's ex-
pected utility, (19), becomes
(A2) E[Ui] {1_(F(l+x*)_F(l_x*))][V(l,1) —z]
l+x* H
+ * V( )f(M)dM.
H=l-x
P0(x*) M14
The first order condition for xS is23
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wherePE(aPo/ax*).Taking a second order approximation and substituting
(Al) for P0 yields








Substituting the derivatives of V(•) into (A5) establishes that XS<XM and
that XS can be either greater or less than xA. The possibility ofXS<XA —-
whichimplies that all equilibria possess too much rigidity --isthe main
departure of these results from the ones in the text. The explanation is that
the price level under rigidity, is greater than one, Its level in the2L
text. Thus real aggregate demand under rigidity is lower than in the text,
which makes it more likely that reducing rigidity would increase welfare.25
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